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Abstract: Informational cascades can be used to augment the existing Austrian business cycle theory. 
As first-order users of knowledge know the direct causes of a price change, they transmit this 
knowledge to second-order users through the price system. Banks with direct knowledge of the sources 
of the fresh liquidity during a credit induced boom have knowledge of the boom's artificial and 
unsustainable nature. Higher-order users lack this direct knowledge, and hence continue investing 
largely ignorant of underlying developments. When first-order users of knowledge sense the boom has 
run its course, they exit the market, sending a strong signal to higher-order knowledge users that the 
boom has ended – a fragile situation built upon an informational cascade begins collapsing. 
Simultaneously, the boom is characterized by an influx of capital and knowledge into the financial 
sector owing to increased profits relative to the real economy stemming from Cantillon effects 
surrounding the credit injection. As knowledge pertaining to real production has also exited, the bust 
commences with a misallocated productive structure requiring equilibration to become consistent with 
consumers' wants. Actions which inhibit this knowledge from returning to the productive structure will 
unnecessarily lengthen the time to recovery. 
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Introduction 
The debate over the continued relevance of Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) has proceeded, 
generating several critical works aimed at criticizing the macro-theory's foundations.2 Although the 
process through which an Austrian business cycle is propagated has been thoroughly explored, there is 
one aspect of the cycle that has received relatively little attention – the point at which boom turns to 
bust. Much recent work has raised diverse new points that demonstrate new rationales for the 
unsustainability of the boom. Huerta de Soto's (1998: 667) application of the prisoner’s dilemma has 
shown that ABCT is not necessarily inconsistent with the rational expectations’ assumption.3 Evans and 
Baxendale (2008) have demonstrated that not all entrepreneurs must err in clusters for the bust to occur. 
Rather, the marginal entrepreneurs are sufficient to entice this change. Additionally, “herding behavior” 
has been suggested as an explanation consistent with ABCT to explain asset bubbles (Koppl 2002, 
Bagus 2008). This paper will build on this existing literature and further strengthen the argument that 
the boom is unsustainable, as well as demonstrate a new problem inhibiting a speedy recovery from the 
bust. To these ends we advance two new knowledge problems. 
 First, informational cascades serve to demonstrate why entrepreneurs are unable to discern the 
true sustainability of the boom. As information loses quality through its shared usage, its transmission 
results in the deterioration of the quality of any decision-making based upon it. The deterioration, and 
in some cases complete loss of knowledge can be explained within the framework of ABCT when 
augmented with some of the existing literature (notably Huerta de Soto 1998 and Bagus 2008).  
 Tullock (1987: 73) posits that there is no particular reason why credit inflation, even high levels 
                                                 
2 Tullock (1987), Cowen (1997), Yeager (1997), and Wagner (1999) provide negative assessments of the relevance and 
fundamental validity of ABCT. Salerno (1989), Block (2001) and Barnett and Block (2005; 2006) provide responses 
stressing the applicability of a properly understood ABCT, used within its logical limitations.  
3 See also Carilli and Dempster (2001) for a similar application and conclusion. Mises (1928: 135-136) also comes to a 
similar conclusion, if in less formal terms. These works are significant as they explain why it is that banks seemingly fail 
to learn from past experience concerning the consequences of an inflationary monetary policy. For even if they did learn, 
the knowledge would be useless if they were still forced into acting in the manner described by Huerta de Soto (1998).  
[3] 
thereof, cannot continue unabated for lengthy and sustained periods of time. Current rationales for the 
change from boom to bust in ABCT show that under inflationary conditions more investment is 
undertaken than real resources exist to sustain. Eventually a resource constraint will become binding, 
with a necessary shift from boom to bust. Of course, if this were the trigger of the bust we would 
expect to see skyrocketing input prices, as scarce resources begin to be intensely bid up to complete 
projects previously undertaken with the expectation of greater resource availability. However, in reality 
the boom need not always reach this point. Instead, it will be demonstrated that entrepreneurs who have 
first-order knowledge of the sources of the credit inflation will exit the market when they sense profits 
under unsustainable conditions have been maximized. This sends a strong signal to the second-order 
users of knowledge – those who have gained access to the knowledge of the augmented credit supply 
only later through the informational cascade – and who adjust their expectations accordingly. A fragile 
situation built upon little knowledge of the true situation is broken. Market participants operating at the 
margin become the fuel that feeds the decline, acting as triggers upon which other marginal 
entrepreneurs are affected negatively.  
 Second, we establish that the turning point in the cycle can best be demonstrated as a 
knowledge problem. As entrepreneurs shift from less to more profitable activities to maximize their 
own personal profit levels, the structure of knowledge concerning production undergoes a shift as well. 
Previously, profit was sought through aligning the real structure of production with the needs of 
consumers via an appropriate Wicksellian natural rate of interest. As profit opportunities become 
relatively abundant in the financial sector augmented with fresh credit, an entrepreneurial shift occurs 
which displaces activity in the real economy by the financial economy. A resultant shift in the structure 
of knowledge occurs simultaneously, as different factors become the focus of profit-seeking activity, 
and as more attention is paid to the monetary authorities at the expense of consumer want preferences. 
 Finally, the particulars concerning the severity and duration of the bust can be explained by two 
[4] 
factors. Sticky prices in the real economy relative to the highly flexible financial economy cause a time 
spread between the relative adjustment processes. Adding to this lag in the real recovery process, 
however, is the knowledge shift that occurred during the boom. As entrepreneurs focused their attention 
on the financial economy, significant knowledge concerning the real economy was ignored or lost. As a 
result, a rebuilding of the structure of knowledge must occur prior to (or at least concurrent with) any 
rebuilding in the structure of production that eliminates the imbalances of the boom. Activity that 
inhibits the re-building process of this structure of knowledge will necessarily affect the rebuilding of 
the structure of production to the detriment of consumers. 
 
Hayekian roots of informational cascades 
Hayek (1945: 536) provided one of the most compelling examples of prices as transmitters of 
information throughout the market.4 His famous “tin example” showed that demand, as well as other 
underlying factors, may arise on the market which affect the prices entrepreneurs are willing to bid for 
certain goods. Price changes will reflect these underlying factors, and entrepreneurs will later become 
implicitly aware of them through these changes. Entrepreneurs need not know the causes of the price 
changes; instead they may retrieve this information through the price system. Provided prices remain 
‘sufficient surrogates’ of the underlying knowledge embedded in them, decisions can be undertaken 
with no negative consequences compared to those made with the actual knowledge of the underlying 
factors affecting these prices 
 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) advance a similar concept, “informational 
cascades”, whereby quality information is sacrificed through the pricing system. First-order users of 
                                                 
4 This distinction may, however, be better attributed to Pigou (1927) as he wrote of individuals routinely abdicating 
responsibility in situations where high amounts of social agreement exist. Particularly important is the emphasis on the 
financial realm whereby attitudes and beliefs towards business conditions are spread and diffused through the market 
with little regard to fundamental reason. Errors in optimism among some segments of the market will be transmitted to 
others with little heed to the underlying causes of such expectations. 
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knowledge – those with direct experience creating the prices which reflect the underlying fundamentals 
– transmit this information to higher-order knowledge users – those who lack a direct link with the 
cause of the knowledge, but who only gain this knowledge through the price system. As individuals 
abandon their individual assessment of the quality of information, a general deterioration results as 
quality becomes a subsidiary concern. Much as Hayek (1945) asserted, individuals no longer concern 
themselves with the particular reasons for price changes. Instead, they accept the price system as an 
approximate summary of these underlying reasons, and economize on resources accordingly. Group 
generated information becomes prevalent and is used by individuals as the basis of their own decisions. 
The critical problem is that individuals lose all incentives for developing good information (i.e., 
accurately based upon the underlying factors that influence it). One considerable failing of 
informational cascades is the lack of attention paid to the question of why entrepreneurs begin to 
disregard quality considerations of the information they use (Bagus and Howden 2009b). Without an 
explanation for this process, the conclusion of a deteriorating level of quality of information in these 
cascades rests on shaky ground. As Thomsen (1992: 48) notes, Hayek's tin example shares a similar 
problem. The knowledge transmitted through the pricing process omits the information regarding the 
reason for the price changes. As a result, prices may tell us how prior entrepreneurs valued the 
knowledge embodied in those prices, but they tell us precious little about how current entrepreneurs 
value the future potential of the summarized knowledge. Hayek (1945) was quite clear that for the 
users of the price system what matters is not the “whys” of price formation The price system may tell 
us much of what others believed past knowledge to signify, but little about its future implications.5 
 A distinction can be made between different “orders” of knowledge users. First-order users are 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Lachmann (1943: 72) had already alluded to the problem of separate knowledge sets and their effect on action, 
stating: “Two farmers confronted with the same observable event, a rise in apple prices, will yet take different views of 
the situation and react differently if one interprets it as a symptom of inflation and the other as indicating a shift in 
demand under the influence of vegetarianism.”  
[6] 
those who know the source of the knowledge summarized by the pricing system. In Hayek's example, 
first-order users of knowledge are those who know that a demand shift has occurred in the tin market, 
resulting in a price increase for the commodity. Higher-order users of tin will only see the increase in 
the price of tin, and need not be concerned with the specific information which originally caused the 
price change. As the knowledge user becomes more distant from the first-order user, they face a 
continual degradation in the quality of their information – that which pertains to the cause of the 
original price change.6 As higher-order users accept the knowledge through the altered price system, 
price changes may be a diminished reflection of the original impetuses for price changes, as these 
reasons are not directly known to the higher-order users.7 
 Hayek's (1937: 34) dictum was that we should question why anyone should be right before we 
ask why they should be wrong. It is pertinent to ask why anyone would accept 'wrong' (or at least 
incomplete) prices before pursuing 'correct' prices.8 If prices are not genuine reflections of the 
underlying knowledge and real conditions, the decision-making process can be perverted accordingly 
with devastating effects on plan coordination.9 If it becomes clear that quality deterioration may be 
                                                 
6 One interesting early application of informational cascades has been presented by Brillouin (1956). As information is 
either held as free (i.e., non-communicated) or bound (i.e., physically transmitted in some manner) the two are linked by 
the possibility of loss of resultant information (i.e., negentropy). In fact, as Brillouin (1956: 155) demonstrates, with any 
transmission of information, the best case scenario is that no loss of relevance results. Hence, with the probability of the 
loss of transmitted knowledge always greater than, or equal to, zero, there is always the strong possibility that 
knowledge will eventually lose relevance through continual transmission. As Brillouin (1964) later shows, each 
additional transmission of information results in a general loss of negentropy (i.e., information). We thank an 
anonymous referee for referring us to this work. 
7 Some may argue that central bank transparency allows individuals to become aware as to the true origin of the fresh 
credit. This is, however, complicated by two factors. First, money's fungibility makes those higher-order users of 
knowledge unaware of what portion of the new liquidity is savings, and that which is credit. Second, as any initial 
increase in bank credit under a fractional reserve system will be compounded as it is transferred among latter recipient 
fractional reserve banks, the degree to which the newly available liquidity is caused directly from an increase of credit 
by the central bank, and that which is caused indirectly by the fractional reserve system, will be difficult to discern. 
8 Keep in mind both Hayek (1968) and Mises (1949; 1951) viewed all prices as disequilibrium prices, and by definition, 
false prices (to use Mises' (1949: 338) words). It is Hayek's competitive discovery process that seeks the necessary 
knowledge to replace these false prices with somewhat less false prices. Indeed, much like Kirzner (1992: 117) stresses, 
it is the existence of these disequilibrium prices that spurs on the entrepreneurial discovery process.  
9 Coordination can occur through ways other than the pricing system. Kirzner (1973: 216) shows this can be achieved 
through the decision to interact with another or not, a signaling process which need not rely on any price. Likewise, 
Thomsen (1992: 90) reminds us that not all action coordinations need result from information coordinations. 
[7] 
sustained through the knowledge transmitted through the pricing mechanism, it remains to be seen why 
it is that this occurs. Entrepreneurs, forever in the search for new profit opportunities, should be able to 
discern the discrepancy between the information they are given through prices, and that which the 
underlying factors suggest should prevail.10  
 One solution to this issue could be that entrepreneurs begin to act irrationally under such boom 
conditions – a type of irrational exuberance or animal spirits. However, as we shall see, the problem of 
deterioration of the quality of information – informational cascades – can obtain even in the presence of 
extreme rationality; for example, rational expectations. 
 
Dilemmas in the monetary realm: an entrepreneurial catch 22 
Huerta de Soto (1998: 667) works within a prisoner's dilemma framework to demonstrate why banks 
will systematically partake in a credit expansion, even if it is known that it will lead to certain 
detriment (i.e., they employ rational expectations). Assuming an exogenous credit expansion, banks are 
faced with a choice between participating in the expansion (which they know or suspect will be short-
lived) and refraining from doing so. An equilibrium obtains with all banks participating in the credit 
expansion, lest they be left behind, or possibly bankrupted, as others do so profitably. 
 One caveat with the above analysis is that although banks may participate in a credit expansion, 
given the assumption of rational expectations, they will do so only for a finite time to maximize profits. 
That implies that they will exit the market prior to a collapse occurring. Relative performance becomes 
important as each desires to compete profitably with their competitors in the short-run, while surviving 
(or more optimally, maintaining relative profits) in the long-run. Timing becomes a central issue as the 
                                                 
10 Huerta de Soto (1998) reckons that in the monetary sphere entrepreneurs are susceptible to being unable to discern 
between one such price – the natural rate of interest. As money is a fungible good, entrepreneurs are unable to identify 
that which has resulted from true savings (i.e., an offsetting reduction in consumption) and that caused by an inflationary 
monetary expansion. Carilli and Dempster (2008) explore some of the difficulties inherent in identifying the real interest 
rate (i.e., that caused by time preference), as they attempt to proxy this from historical savings rates. 
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key to this process is exiting the market at the correct time.  
 The resultant catch 22 breeds an informational cascade. Banks cannot resist from participating 
in the inflationary process as this will leave them at a profit disadvantage to their competitors. As they 
must partake, they create a continual reduction in the quality of information transmitted through the 
price system which is dependent on the money they are responsible for distributing through the real 
economy. For example, in the prisoner's dilemma, we assume that all participants realize that it is 
collectively more beneficial to refrain from participating in the inflationary boom. However, any one 
participant will realize that if they cheat while others refrain from doing so, substantial profit 
opportunities will abound. One of two things can result. Either another bank will identify that the same 
original profit opportunity from 'cheating' exists and partake accordingly, or they will realize that a 
competitor is 'cheating' and be forced to do so as well to maintain relative profits. In either case, the 
decision is made on the basis of the information of competitors' actions, regardless of what the 
individual actor deems optimal based upon their personal (i.e., independent) information. The catch 22 
that develops is that, although all may individually know a more optimal decision in the face of the 
uncertain outcome, all will rely on the collective decision of the others to base their action on. The 
private information about the detriment of the credit expansion becomes secondary to the group 
information concerning how to maintain relative profits. 
 Not only do banks get swept into the catch 22 by increasing loans in this situation but 
individuals become active participants through the informational cascade. As individuals become 
higher-order users of the knowledge transmitted through the increased credit, it is clear that it becomes 
increasingly difficult for them to ascertain the source of the increased supply of credit. As the fresh 
credit, exogenously increased by the central bank, is transmitted further from the source, information 
pertaining to this source is gradually lost. Individuals become less aware that the origin of the new 
credit was central bank induced inflation, and not through a general increase in the savings rate. 
[9] 
 It may become clear at this point that two groups of entrepreneurs are acting upon two different 
knowledge sets.11 
 The first set of entrepreneurs are those that have access to the true source of the boom (the 
inflationary monetary policy) – first-order users of knowledge (i.e., primary dealers, bankers, etc). As 
has been demonstrated through the prisoner's dilemma, this group will be forced to partake in the 
boom, lest they be forced out of the market by declining relative profit rates compared to those earned 
by other active participants. As this group may have knowledge as to the boom's unsustainable nature, 
they will only participate conditional on exiting prior to the bust developing.  
 The second group are those higher-order users of the public knowledge that has been created by 
those first-order users, and transmitted along the informational cascade. As quality has deteriorated as it 
is passed through users, by the time this second group gains access, they will not have the underlying 
information concerning its true source. Hence, although new credit is now available, this group lacks 
the knowledge concerning if this has been created through an endogenous increase in real savings, or 
through an inflationary monetary expansion. For this group, the mere existence of the new funds is 
enough to signal its availability; no heed need be given as to the origin of these funds. The necessary 
ancillary background information has been lost. Lacking the underlying information as to the available 
credit's origin, they see only its existence, and hence, cannot give explicit heed to its continued 
expansion.12 Indeed, as Prechter (2001: 121) states, the tendency for higher-order users to accept the 
information as given without questioning its underlying quality, 
 
                                                 
11 Garrison (1982: 133) recognizes the implications of Hayek (1945) regarding the duality of knowledge with which agents 
will be acting upon. Hence, one set of Hayek's tin users know directly the knowledge of the new demand conditions, and 
another group becomes aware of this through the actions of this first group – they lack the information as to the original 
source of the demand shift. 
12 The fragility of cascades based on their minimal amounts of underlying information is explored in Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992; 1998), Gale (1996), Eichengreen et al. (1998), Lee (1998), Bikhchandani and Sharma 
(2000), and Goeree et al. (2007). 
[10] 
… is not simply fairly common; it is ubiquitous. Most people get virtually all their ideas about 
financial markets from other people, through newspapers, television, tipsters, and analysts, 
without checking a thing. They think, “Who am I to check? These other people are supposed 
to be the experts.” 
 
Heterogeneous entrepreneurs and the exit-point 
That the bust is set in motion by the first-order users of knowledge concerning the origins of the newly 
created credit relies on the concept of distinct entrepreneurial groups working with separate knowledge 
sets. Much existing literature looks at the effects that heterogeneous entrepreneurs have on the business 
cycle. Shleifer and Summers (1990) and de Long et al. (1990) divide entrepreneurs into two groups. 
The first are rational speculators (arbitrageurs, smart money, fundamentalists) who base their actions on 
economic fundamentals. This group is assumed risk averse, with a relatively short time horizon. The 
second group contains “noise traders” – those who display at least some degree of assumed 
irrationality. They are assumed to be less sophisticated and more susceptible to fads, rumors, or other 
ancillary information. In short, their actions cannot be fully explained by the market's fundamental 
data. Trade between these two groups feeds a bubble, with rational speculators participating so that 
they may sell out in the future as the situation turns unsustainable.13 
 Evans and Baxendale (2008) build off this framework, taking issue with the claim that ABCT 
fails to account for a turning-point from boom to bust as it cannot explain why entrepreneurs 
systematically err in clusters. By showing that once we eschew the concept of homogeneous 
                                                 
13 For earlier attempts at classifying investors into groups endowed with heterogeneous information see Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1976; 1980), Townsend (1983), and Stein (1987). Most of these approaches treat knowledge as a costly 
commodity, thus affecting the degree with which it will be sought, and ignore the entrepreneurial discovery process of 
unearthing and directing this new knowledge. Hence, one group of entrepreneurs become automatons as they simply 
follow the actions of the other group. See Kirzner (1984b: 205), Thomsen (1992: 33-36), Boettke (1997: 31), Huerta de 
Soto (1992; 2004), and Sautet (2000: 9) for critiques of this dualism of entrepreneurs, based upon an objectively defined 
knowledge. 
[11] 
entrepreneurs for heterogeneous ones, it is only the marginal entrepreneurs that must fail to create the 
bust. As we incorporate this concept of heterogeneous entrepreneurs into our existing framework, we 
find that these second-order users of knowledge only receive information concerning the boom's 
sustainability after the first-order users make this evident. Hence, as first-order users sense the boom 
has run its course, they exit from the market, enticing a drop in demand for investments which is 
signaled through the price system to the higher-order users of knowledge. This sparks a contagion 
effect whereby increased selling informs other entrepreneurs of the real sustainability (or lack thereof) 
of the current situation. The disparity between the two entrepreneurial classes, one based upon their 
respective place in the pecking-order of knowledge receipt, gives rise to one class being at a stark 
disadvantage when the boom has run its course.14 
 There is, however, a secondary effect of the knowledge transmission process which serves to 
complicate the boom's sustainability, as well as affect the duration of the bust. A shift in knowledge 
occurs during the boom which moves resources into newly profitable sectors of the economy. As 
Cantillon effects make the financial sector more profitable than the real sector, entrepreneurial 
resources are shifted in search of these new profits, at the expense of the real productive sector. 
 
Intra and inter sector resource shifts 
Much existing literature on ABCT focuses on the shifts of entrepreneurial resources that occur along 
the structure of production during an artificially induced boom. Hence, industries in the higher-orders 
of production see a relative increase in resources compared to those lower-order, or consumers', 
industries. More recently, attention has been directed to shifts of entrepreneurial resources within the 
                                                 
14 Lachmann claims that interest rate expectations are inelastic, and may only remain inelastic if the underlying 
fundamentals comprising the current monetary situation are known (1943: 79). As second-order knowledge users are 
largely unaware of this underlying situation, their interest expectations can be highly elastic – resulting in an acceptance 
for the increased quantity of credit at a lower than natural interest rate. Mises (1943: 251-252) responds to Lachmann 
from a different angle, stating that the interest rate need not be visibly depressed compared to other periods, but only 
lower than it would be if the inflationary monetary conditions were appropriately accounted for. 
[12] 
firm (Leijonhufvud 1981: 248; Horwitz 2000: 119; Koppl 2002: 120; 2003; Bagus 2008). Inefficiencies 
are bred as entrepreneurs focus on monitoring the behavior of monetary authorities, at the expense of 
the consumers, whose wants the entrepreneur otherwise aims to serve. 
 Lacking an inflationary monetary policy, entrepreneurs focus their attention on the profit 
avenues deemed most rewarding given consumer preferences. These manifest through the structure of 
production, as production must be undertaken cohesively with the final wants of consumers. To the 
extent that entrepreneurs are able to produce goods and services that consumers desire, profits can be 
maximized. The result is a structure of production with two inherent features. First, the end value of 
produced goods is determined by the real value of consumption goods demanded by consumers. This 
demand is tempered on the consumption end by the applicable savings rate that consumers have 
chosen, and hence, the residual income component available to be directed towards consumption. This 
savings rate, in turn, results in a natural rate of interest. Entrepreneurs act upon this rate to lengthen or 
shorten the structure of production as technology levels, resource availability, and savings deem 
appropriate. Hence, a production structure lacking misallocation or over-production has a consumption-
determined level of output (both final output and stage specific) and a length approximated by the real 
rate of savings prevailing in the economy.  
 An exogenous augmentation in the money supply (through central bank induced inflation, for 
example) serves to create distortions along both dimensions which were previously trending toward 
equilibration through relative profit rates. Entrepreneurs had profited earlier through forecasting 
consumers' demands appropriately and shifting the structure of production to account for applicable 
demand shifts. Now, with the introduction of an exogenous monetary change, a new type of profit 
opportunity emerges, as influenced by monetary policy. Hence, entrepreneurs will no longer profit 
solely by satisfying consumer wants, but also by correctly predicting changes in monetary policy by the 
proper authority (generally the central bank), with significant profit opportunities resulting by 
[13] 
equilibrating the changes occurring in the monetary realm.15 
 Powell (2002) and Callahan and Garrison (2003) look at two recent financial crises – Japan's 
crash in the late 1990s and America's dot-com bust, respectively. In particular, they point out the 
Cantillon effects which occur whereby the first users of newly created money are able to benefit from it 
before the general price level increases to counter its presence. As inflation builds an effect is created 
whereby it is more difficult to estimate what the true consumer demand for goods is, as well as the true 
savings rate prevailing with which to determine an appropriate length for the production structure.16 A 
shift in entrepreneurial focus occurs with increased attention paid to the monetary factors affecting 
these variables, and not the true underlying fundamentals which were previously afforded primary 
focus. Although there is a shift towards monitoring the monetary authorities in search of profits, a 
secondary shift occurs owing to these Cantillon effects. Hence, as the financial sector remains the 
origin of the fresh credit, relative profits are increased at the expense of the real sector, which will not 
receive the increased funds until a later time. The production realm takes on an increasingly 
insignificant importance due to a relative decrease in profit opportunities compared to the financial 
sector.17 A shift occurs where entrepreneurs are drawn from the real sector (i.e., that generally 
concerned with maintaining the structure of production) into the financial sector (i.e., that concerned 
with forecasting changes in the monetary realm).18 
 The question that gains pertinence at this point is: “Why would an entrepreneurial drain from 
                                                 
15 See, in particular, Koppl and Mramor (2003: 256) as they state: “[S]uccess now becomes more closely tied to 
anticipating the behavior of the Big Player [i.e., the central bank], resulting in a reallocation of entrepreneurial alertness 
toward this task and away from fundamentals.” 
16 A true demand for goods would correspond to the renunciation of consumption in the present – real savings. 
17 We may think of the recent shifts from production to finance that occurred in America's economy over the last boom – 
profits from production at GM diminished as its financing arm, GMAC, enjoyed increased growth and profitability. 
Similar cases can be found in many previously large American production companies (i.e., Ford, GE, etc.). Bagus and 
Howden (2009a) analyze Iceland's recent financial crisis, particularly noting the preceding shift that allocated capital 
from the real sector (characterized mainly by the fishing industry), into the financial sector (characterized by banking 
and financial speculation). 
18 See Bagus (2008: 291): “[T]he shift in the structure of knowledge or human capital during the asset price boom parallels 
the shift in non-human capital that has long been at the center of ABCT.” 
[14] 
the real sector have such damaging long-term results, such as those resulting from a bust?” An 
entrepreneurial shift will only occur to a point where profits between the two sectors – real and 
financial – are equalized. Hence, profits in the real sector should increase to a point where the profit 
rate of the financial economy is situated. Two significant factors delay the equilibration of profits and 
actually cause a greater divergence as the entrepreneurial shift occurs. 
 First, we may look at an ancillary conclusion from Dornbusch (1976). As adjustments in the real 
economy are stickier than those of the financial sector, we see a general 'overshooting' of financial 
sector prices relative to what the underlying real fundamentals would suggest.19 Dornbusch's 
conclusion of a general over-reaction of financial sector prices has an important corollary – a relative 
under-reaction of real asset prices. This reflection will manifest in profit levels in the real economy, 
which will stay relatively level despite the exodus of entrepreneurs into the financial realm. 
 Second are the effects from the herding behavior, as outlined in Bagus (2008).20 The 
entrepreneurial shift from the real sector to the financial sector entails not only a knowledge shift, but a 
capital shift as well. Entrepreneurs take with them money which was previously used for real 
production, and begin speculating on financial assets. This influx places upward pressure on prices in 
the financial sector, which benefits the profit margins of those who have entered before the monetary 
                                                 
19 Much “rational bubble” literature focuses on this disconnect between real and financial asset prices. Froot and Obsfeld 
(1991) note that “intrinsic bubbles” develop as fundamental values are departed from for extended periods of time due to 
the fact that they come to be viewed as either under or over valued. Hence, initial “mispricings” may also reinforce 
future ones, creating a bubble. Tirole (1982) demonstrates that price bubbles cannot occur in assets having a finite life, 
and hence, determinable equilibrium value. Tirole (1985) furthers this to account for individual time horizons that 
continually update and reset to achieve bubbles in assets of finite life, in a dynamic setting. Koppl and Mramor (2003: 
256), in distinction, reckon bubbles become irrational manifestations of herding behavior. The fact remains that 
rationality has not changed concerning the end goal sought by entrepreneurs (i.e., profits), rather the only change is the 
means used to attain the profit oriented goal. 
20 Bagus identifies three sources of the herding phenomenon: 1. illusory gains increase optimism, 2. credit expansion 
creates the belief that production is possible without consumption restraint (i.e., Huerta de Soto 1998), and 3. increased 
financial profits attract new entrepreneurs to exploit profit opportunities (i.e., Mueller 2001: 14). Davenow and Welch 
(1996), and Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) provide some alternative sources of herding behavior and review the 
relevant literature. See also Koppl and Yeager (1996), Ahmed et al. (1997), Gilanshah and Koppl (2001), Koppl and 
Mramor (2003), and Koppl and Sarjanovic (2003), for empirical looks at herding behavior caused by “Big Players” (i.e., 
those who are influential, insensitive to profit and loss, and have discretion over the exercise of their power) in the 
financial markets. 
[15] 
influx occurred. This increase in profits then sends a signal to other entrepreneurs of the more attractive 
opportunities that await them if they leave the productive sector (i.e., the “old” economy) and enter the 
financial sector (i.e., the “new” economy).21 Hence, just as increased liquidity through fresh capital 
provided the original impetus for the entrepreneurial shift to the financial economy, the continued and 
increasing profits driven by additional entrepreneurs entering the sector (with their capital) breeds the 
environment which encourages continued entrance; the herd has started moving to greener pastures.22 
 Despite the shift occurring from one sector to another, one thing remains homogeneous among 
all entrepreneurs – the desire to maximize profits by seeking out undiscovered opportunities to exploit. 
However, while the end sought remains the same, the means utilized shift dramatically.23 Instead of 
forecasting consumers' demands, the new financial entrepreneurs are more concerned with forecasting 
changes in the monetary environment (Leijonhufvud 1981: 248; Horwitz 2000: 119; Koppl 2002: 120; 
2003; Bagus 2008). The attention is directed toward the monetary authority in an attempt to gain 
knowledge of future changes which will affect the financial realm, rather than those changes that will 
effect the real economy directly. 
  A second-order effect of the entrepreneurial shift adds to the herding mentality and feeds the 
loss of production oriented entrepreneurs. Not only are the relative profits of the financial and real 
sectors competing against each other for capital, the relative profits within the financial sector add a 
competitive element within itself. Hence, not only are entrepreneurs driven to seek higher relative 
profits in the financial sector vis-à-vis the real sector, they are also seeking higher relative profits than 
                                                 
21 Remembering the implications of Dornbusch (1976), the real sector (defined by sticky prices) will experience little 
direct impact in the form of downward pressure on prices resulting from this monetary capital shift. 
22 Paradoxically, one ancillary effect is that the previous pasture remains quite green. With fewer entrepreneurs exploiting 
profit opportunities in the real sector, there will be upward pressure placed on profit margins. Although these may 
increase in absolute terms compared to the scenario before the entrepreneurial shift, they will remain lower than exist in 
the financial sector, a condition necessary to ensure the shift continues. 
23 The homogeneity of the end sought (profit) answers the problem raised against herding behavior theory by 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000: 13): “[T]o examine herd behavior, one needs to find a group of participants that trade 
actively and act similarly.”  
[16] 
others within the financial sector (Horwitz 2003: 87; Bagus 2008: 291). An increase in demand for 
financial entrepreneurs (investment advisers, Fed watchers, etc) drives a further exodus from the real 
economy and into the financial sector. 
 This shift breeds a new type of financial entrepreneur that would not exist lacking the 
exogenous credit expansion (“noise traders” to use Shleifer and Summers (1990) and de Long et al's 
(1990) preferred terminology). This in itself is, however, not a sign of irrationality. As was previously 
mentioned, the uniting factor among all entrepreneurs is the drive to seek out and exploit undiscovered 
profit opportunities. The new entrepreneurs are merely making a rational shift into the financial sector, 
as higher relative profits are signaling disequilibria that require adjustment. Due to the informational 
cascade in effect, some new entrepreneurs see the shift as permanent (i.e., buy and hold), while others 
see the new economy as unsustainable, but requiring an exit strategy to maximize profits (market 
timers).  
 
From boom to bust 
The caveat in this entrepreneurial shift has been that one group of entrepreneurs – the first-order users 
of knowledge – have knowledge that the inflation has been caused by an exogenous credit injection and 
not through increased real savings, while another group – those higher-order knowledge users – have 
no such knowledge of this effect, only gaining it later through the informational cascade. Higher-order 
users will not have any reason to believe that the current monetary situation is unsustainable. Resultant 
prices created by higher-order knowledge users of the cascade will show a continual reduction in 
quality as a result of the loss of the true information base pertaining to the transmitted knowledge. It 
becomes clear that at some point in time the first-order users who think the inflationary trend has ended 
will exit, thus signaling to second-order knowledge users to shift their focus on pursuing opportunities 
in greener pastures. 
[17] 
 Activities built upon the informational cascade are of a fragile nature. As they are based on 
little, if any, underlying fundamental information they are instead highly conditioned by the actions of 
other individuals. That point when first-order users of knowledge start refraining from reinvesting, as 
well as start selling existing investments, sends a strong signal to those higher-order users of 
knowledge. At this point, it need not matter where the money moves into, only that it exits the 
previously green pasture. Simultaneously, the system of price acceptance by the second-order users of 
the knowledge provided through the pricing mechanism may begin to break down. As the knowledge 
embodied through prices has become too “dirty” to use, a shift may occur where the true underlying 
informational element of the system is sought after. As Grossman (1976: 585) states: “[S]ome traders 
want to know why prices are, for example, unusually high. It is not enough for traders to observe only 
prices.” As the fragile pricing system begins to break down, money and capital flow out of the 
uncertain financial market and into more certain, or higher yielding, areas of the economy.  
 This outflow of liquidity will have deflationary effects on financial prices, with the result that 
average profits in the sector will also decline. For the second-order knowledge users, a relatively small 
amount of knowledge can change their opinion about the current situation. As entrepreneurs begin 
exiting the financial markets, profits decline, and a new signal is provided to entrepreneurs – the 
monetary influx was not sustainable and has now ended.  
 Compounding this problem are Evans and Baxendale's (2008) marginal entrepreneurs. Those 
who were only experiencing marginal profitability at the peak now find themselves with declining 
profits, or outright losses. Typically, late-comers to the financial sector – those who bought assets when 
prices were near their peaks – will be the first to experience losses as a relatively small fall in prices 
will erase much of their profit margin. These entrepreneurs will be quickly enticed to shift into higher 
yielding assets, thus adding to the outflow of capital from the financial economy. This additional 
deflationary pressure creates a strong feedback loop where entrepreneurs exit as a decreased amount of 
[18] 
liquidity in the financial sector causes downward pressure on profits, with an entrepreneurial shift away 
from the financial sector compounding this problem. 
 Two notes on the departing liquidity should be qualified. First, the strong possibility of 
insolvency and outright bankruptcies by some entrepreneurs will erase the “paper” profits of others 
and, hence, also place downward pressure on the relative amount of capital exiting the sector. Second is 
that the outflow of funds will shift to where profits are expected to be highest. This need not be a 
complete exit from the financial sector. For example, although profits in the stock market may decline 
beneath those in the real sector, the bond market may offer the highest expected rate of profit, thus 
enticing capital inflows through these expected relative gains. 
 The typical presentation of the ABC has a credit injection disrupting a simplistic loanable funds' 
model (see, for example, Garrison (2001). As the rate of increase of monetary capital is greater than the 
true real rate of monetary savings, a decrease in the interest rate below the Wicksellian natural rate 
results. From here a conclusion is drawn that the structure of production is lengthened – investments 
previously unprofitable at the higher natural rate now become attractive at the lower rate, brought about 
by an augmentation of credit. What the loanable funds model overlooks is the heterogeneity of avenues 
the credit injection may be directed into. Implicitly it is assumed that producers become the recipients 
of the credit and use it on production spending, thus affecting the real structure of production. 
However, fresh credit generally feeds into the financial markets initially (i.e., real estate, bond or stock 
markets) which delays any disruptions to the real structure of production (Bagus 2008).  
 The bust may be temporarily delayed if the outflow of money from one area of the financial 
sector can be transferred to another area within the sector (a flow from the stock market to real estate, 
for example). The issue that will eventually arise, however, is that the gains in the financial sector will 
be illusory and may not continue indefinitely. The real sector, as illustrated through the structure of 
production, must ultimately remain aligned with the ultimate consumption preferences of consumers. 
[19] 
During the boom phase when profits are strong in the financial sector, the economy as a whole gives 
the appearance that this is uniformly so. Illusory profits in the financial sector may more than offset the 
actual, but relatively declining, profits in the real productive sector giving the impression that the 
aggregate economy is performing well. However, when the bust occurs in the financial sector, it 
becomes apparent that the real productive structure has undergone a debilitating shift during the boom. 
 The entrepreneurial shift which previously occurred left the real economy with a lack of 
entrepreneurs to maintain the structure of production. This was not immediately apparent as aggregate 
profits in the economy remained strong, due to the illusory financial gains. However, with the newly 
diminished importance of the financial sector, the focus returns to a real economy that is woefully 
disequilibrated from the consumption requirements of the market.24 
 
The recovery phase 
Discoordinations in the structure of production require time to return a state of malinvestment to one 
consistent with the preferences of consumers and hence, capable of a growth revival. The financial 
sector is able to shed its discoordinations quickly (although evidently with much pain) as few natural 
rigidities exist within this realm. Prices are able to adjust quickly to regain values consistent with what 
the underlying fundamentals suggest. In comparison, the real economy is subject to many frictions 
which make the adjustment process potentially lengthy. Time-lags in production mean that 
misallocations of capital may take significant amounts of time to be repaired. Heterogeneous capital 
will need to be redistributed which may involve a significant waiting period as entrepreneurs search for 
a capital structure consistent with consumer demands. Labor in particular exhibits pronounced rigidities 
                                                 
24 Of course, only in equilibrium could a situation exist where entrepreneurs are coordinating the needs between consumers 
and producers optimally and sustainably (see Kirzner 1984a: 415; 1984b: 204). However, as has been shown, a situation 
exists which complicates the problem in a much more fundamental way through an inflation induced informational 
cascade which not only disrupts the convergence between consumption and production needs, but between the 
productive economy and the financial economy as well. 
[20] 
as workers must undergo both locational, as well as occupational, changes required by the new 
production structure. 
 A significant factor influencing the length of recovery time required in the real sector is the 
knowledge shift which occurred during the boom phase. Entrepreneurs that previously developed the 
productive capabilities of the economy were drawn into the financial sector resulting in an alteration of 
the required knowledge and skill-set. While entrepreneurs previously succeeded by remaining aware of 
changing market demands based on consumer wants, a new knowledge set was bred which shifted the 
focus to the changing monetary environment. With the onset of the bust, an entrepreneurial shift must 
occur which relocates the financial entrepreneurs back to the role of productive entrepreneurs. The 
knowledge previously acquired concerning the monetary arena may be of little use with the new 
productive focus.25 
 Measures which disrupt this learning process, although lessening the immediate hardships of the 
bust, will prolong the length of time until a healthy recovery may occur. Bailouts for bankrupt firms 
will delay the immediate pain caused by losses and layoffs of the affected companies, however, a 
significant disruption of the healthy learning process will result. As entrepreneurs do not learn that the 
activity chosen was not conducive to a healthy structure of production (i.e., one structured according to 
real savings rates and producing goods demanded by consumers) the bust will continue until the 
learning process is complete. Only when entrepreneurs have regained knowledge of maintaining a 
productive structure parallel in both length and breadth to the demands of consumers and constraints of 
real resources may a period of healthy growth resume. 
 A healthy recovery phase, then, will be one characterized by an allowance for entrepreneurs to 
                                                 
25 Some posit that the bust is caused by a loss of confidence in the financial markets (i.e., Bagus 2008: 292). However, this 
is a proximal effect, not a cause of the bust. The cause of the loss of confidence is that loss of knowledge concerning the 
real economy. As the solution is now known to lie in creating a more cohesive productive structure, entrepreneurs are in 
a position where the necessary knowledge to do so is lost, or temporarily forgotten. With no immediate knowledge of 
how to rectify the malinvestments in the economy, entrepreneurs may then lose confidence in their own ability to 
navigate the ensuing storm.  
[21] 
replace the skills learned in the previous expansionary financial environment with the skills needed for 
the maintenance of the production structure. To the extent that entrepreneurs are inhibited from 
achieving this necessary state, a healthy recovery phase will be delayed. 
 
Conclusion 
Austrian business cycle theory has faced criticisms which center on the exact process which shifts the 
artificially induced boom into a necessary bust. By viewing entrepreneurs as heterogeneous actors, we 
find that disparities in the quality of information each respective entrepreneur utilizes will breed 
differences in how long they believe the boom period will remain profitable. 
 Informational cascades provide a necessary link in understanding how the boom period reverts 
to bust, thus answering criticisms previously inadequately attended to. The inherent deterioration in the 
quality of knowledge one set of entrepreneurs has available leads to erroneous conclusions as to the 
sustainability of the boom. As entrepreneurs with knowledge of the true sustainability of the situation 
exit the financial economy when they perceive the boom period to have run its course, a signal is sent 
to other entrepreneurs that the knowledge they previously acted upon was at best tenuously linked to 
the true underlying information. A fragile situation begins to collapse, with marginally profitable 
entrepreneurs going bankrupt or otherwise exiting the market, thus compounding losses and placing 
downward pressure on others' profits.  
 Relative profits in the financial sector are higher than in the real productive sector as this sector 
marks the entry point of the fresh monetary injection into the economy. As entrepreneurs are drawn into 
the relatively more profitable financial sector, two important resources are drained from the structure of 
production. First, money capital is removed and used for speculative purposes. Second, a removal of 
entrepreneurial knowledge occurs as individuals shift their attention away from consumer demands and 
toward the monetary authority's actions. The continual influx of fresh credit into the financial sector 
[22] 
places upward pressure on financial profits, while the disappearance of profit exploiting entrepreneurs 
from the real sector places upward pressure on production-oriented profits. As the relative profit spread 
between financial and real sectors remains positive (due to the Cantillon effects from the credit 
injection), the shift of capital and entrepreneurs will continue relatively unabated, thus draining 
resources from the real sector. 
 As the existing structure of production has become inconsistent with prevailing time 
preferences and resource availability, a necessary bust must occur to create a structure consistent with 
these demands. As a knowledge shift occurred which replaced knowledge of production with that of 
financial and monetary speculation, a learning process must be undertaken by entrepreneurs before the 
economy may reach a point where healthy recovery is possible. To the extent that this process is 
disrupted, a true sustainable recovery will be delayed. 
 An increasing body of ABCT literature focuses on knowledge problems stemming from an 
artificially increased credit supply. This paper has added two new aspects to the theory. First, we have 
shown how informational cascades result in a degradation of information among higher-order 
knowledge users, which leaves them at a loss to understand the true sustainability of the boom. The 
fragile nature of their knowledge rests on the actions of others. Hence, when those individuals with 
first-order knowledge concerning the true source of the fresh credit sense the boom has run its course 
and exit accordingly, a signal is sent to those who lacked knowledge of the economy's unsustainable 
nature. Second, the existing literature showing a shift in the entrepreneur's focus to the actions of the 
monetary authorities, has been augmented with a real resource shift to the financial sector. Hence, not 
only is there a misallocation of resources along the structure of production, but also a shift from the 
real to financial sector of the economy. As entrepreneurs and resources are shifted into the newly 
profitable financial sector at the expense of the real sector, a loss of knowledge concerning how to 
maintain a structure of production aligned with consumer demands occurs. Disruptions to 
[23] 
entrepreneurs' abilities to relearn this lost knowledge will prolong the bust needlessly. Thus, a more 
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